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INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by prohibiting member colleges from offering their athletes 
compensation equal to the full cost of their college attendance.1 Nevertheless, 
the O’Bannon decision failed to enjoin the NCAA from maintaining its rules 
that prevent colleges from paying their athletes directly in cash or with 
additional in-kind benefits.2 
At present, the antitrust status of the NCAA’s “no pay” rules again are 
the subject of legal challenge in Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association—a lawsuit that seeks to further overturn the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules that “plac[e] a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid 
to [college] athletes for their services.”3 Although the NCAA has claimed that 
                                                                                                             
 1. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Today, we 
reaffirm that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be tested 
in the crucible of the Rule of Reason.”). Although the NCAA had long purported 
in its public relations materials and media that it allowed colleges to provide 
athletes with scholarships to cover the cost of their education, until the O’Bannon 
ruling, the NCAA’s maximum scholarship levels maintained a several thousand dollar 
per year shortfall between the maximum amount of athletic scholarship money 
permissible under NCAA rules and the true cost of a student-athlete attending college. 
See Free Ride Still Costs Athletes, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.espn.com 
/college-sports/news/story?id=5728653 [https://perma.cc/VK2A-PMDQ]; see also 
Study: College Athletes Worth Six Figures Live Below the Poverty Line, DREXEL 
NOW (Sept. 13, 2011), http://drexel.edu/now/archive/2011/September/Study-Col 
lege-Athletes-Worth-Six-Figures-Live-Below-Federal-Poverty-Line (explaining that 
a study entitled “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport” shows that the 
average scholarship shortfall per college athlete during the 2010–2011 school year 
was $3,222 per athlete) [https://perma.cc/TY3Y-5UB6]; Ed Payne, Report: College 
Scholarship Athletes are Living in Poverty, CNN (Sept. 13, 2011), http://edi 
tion.cnn.com/2011/SPORT/09/13/full.scholarships (also citing to the annual average 
student-athlete out of pocket expense of $3,222 per year) [https://perma.cc/BD2U-
5ACE]. Although this amount is defined as a “full grant-in-aid,” it does not include 
money to cover the costs of all meals, travel to and home from college, basic living 
expenses, or even books marked as recommended reading by the student-athletes’ 
professors; see also Complaint at 3, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. Mar. 
17, 2014) (“[U]nder NCAA and Power Conference Rules, players may receive only 
tuition, required institutional fees, room and board, and required course-related 
books in exchange for their services.”).  
 2. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076. 
 3. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955, 974–75 (N.D.Cal. 2014) (“The amateurism provision in the NCAA’s current 
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“pay-for-play arrangements would transform the intercollegiate sports model 
into a minor league in which the virtues of college sports . . . would disappear,” 
advocates on behalf of players’ rights recognize that, even absent pay, the 
operation of college football and men’s basketball already “has the feel of a 
professional economic machine.”4  
This Article serves as a prelude to the litigation in Jenkins. Part I of this 
Article provides a brief overview of the current economics of NCAA 
Division I men’s basketball and NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) 
football. Part II explores the underlying antitrust challenges to the NCAA’s 
“no pay” rules in both O’Bannon and Jenkins. Finally, Part III explains how 
the issue of consumer demand applies to the expected antitrust analysis in 
Jenkins, and why a strong consumer demand survey would help the 
plaintiffs to prevail in Jenkins.  
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 
Although United States colleges have competed in organized sports 
for almost 150 years, the commercial market for intercollegiate sports has 
grown substantially over the past generation.5 At present, college sports 
represent an $11 billion enterprise, with most college athletic revenue 
derived from FBS football and Division I (“D-I”) men’s basketball.6 
According to a recent report produced by USA Today, during the 2014–
2015 academic year, 40 NCAA member colleges earned athletic revenues 
that exceeded $80 million.7 Meanwhile, four NCAA member colleges 
earned athletic revenues that exceeded $150 million.8  
                                                                                                             
constitution states that student-athletes ‘shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, 
and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental, and social benefits to be derived.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 4. William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism: Saving Intercollegiate 
Athletics Through Conference-Athlete Revenue Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551, 
554, 561 (2016). 
 5. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.  
 6. See Marc Edelman, How Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Hope for Tangible Change, 68 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 809, 809 (2016). 
 7. See NCAA Finances 2014-15, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com 
/ncaa/finances (last visited June 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/G87D-Y2GR]. 
 8. See id. (indicating that these colleges include Texas A&M University, the 
University of Texas, Ohio State University, and the University of Michigan). 
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If American colleges were for-profit entities, FBS football and D-I 
men’s basketball programs would produce shareholder profits.9 Because 
the colleges that compete in NCAA D-I sports are entirely non-profits, 
however, the collegiate sports model is subject to a non-distribution 
restraint.10 Thus, instead of producing profits, these collegiate athletics 
departments must either reinvest their revenues into the college overall or 
reallocate their revenues as “windfall payments” to some set of quasi-
shareholders.11 
Presuming that a college athletics department chooses to reallocate 
some of its athletic revenue to individuals, two potential classes of quasi-
shareholders reasonably might stand to benefit from the financial success 
of college sports: (1) collegiate athletes, who serve as the primary labor 
force behind revenue-producing sporting events; and (2) college sports 
“managers” who supervise these events—sports administrators, athletics 
directors, and coaches.12 In this vein, the NCAA’s “Principle of 
Amateurism” is not truly about some lofty social ideal,13 but rather is about 
a specific allocative scheme that keeps college athletics revenues “in the 
hands of a select few administrators, athletics directors, and coaches.”14 
                                                                                                             
 9. Marc Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee Athletes: Why a ‘Pay 
for Play’ Model of College Sports Would Not Necessarily Make Educational 
Scholarships Taxable, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1137 (2017). 
 10. Id. (citing Gordon Winston, Why Can’t a College Be More Like a Firm, 
5 CHANGE 32 (1997)). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 5–6. 
 13. Professor Berry explains that increasing evidence exists that the current 
model of big-time college sports does not even serve an educational mission for 
students. Cf. Berry, supra note 4, at 554. (“The current model compromises the 
quality and scope of the education received by student-athletes, particularly in 
revenue sports.”). 
 14. Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College 
Basketball, 35 U. MICH. L. REV. 861, 864 (2002). To further buttress this point, 
even the NCAA’s purported bright-line rule requiring college athlete amateurism 
contains exceptions where the compensation of college athletes arguably would 
not even affect the potential distributions available to the college administrators, 
athletics directors, and coaches who vote to preserve the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules. For example, the NCAA rules allow tennis players to receive payments of 
up to $10,000 per year for playing their sport. Thus, a tennis player who begins 
competing at a young age theoretically could accept upwards of $50,000 in 
payments without being seen in violation of the NCAA amateurism bylaws. 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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II. CHALLENGING NCAA “NO PAY” RULES UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
Until recently, few college athletes had challenged the NCAA Principle 
of Amateurism.15 As the revenues associated with big-time college sports 
have increased, however, college athletes have begun to use antitrust 
lawsuits to challenge the NCAA Principle of Amateurism and its associated 
“no pay” rules.16 
A. An Introduction to Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that “[e]very 
contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy in the restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”17 Read literally, Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act seems to prohibit all commercial contracts.18 Most courts, 
however, have interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit only 
those contracts that “unreasonably” restrain trade.19 
1. Antitrust Basics 
To determine whether a particular restraint violates Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, a court typically will apply a two-part test.20 First, the court 
must determine whether the alleged restraint involves concerted action 
between two legally distinct entities in a manner that affects interstate 
commerce (“threshold requirements”).21 Then, a court must consider whether 
the alleged restraint “unduly suppresses competition within any relevant 
market” (“competitive effects analysis”).22 
In assessing the threshold requirements of an antitrust challenge, a 
court typically will consider two separate sub-elements: (1) concerted 
                                                                                                             
 15. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053 (“As far as we are aware, the district 
court’s decision [in O’Bannon] is the first by any federal court to hold that any 
aspect of the NCAA’s amateurism rules violate the antitrust laws, let alone to 
mandate by injunction that the NCAA change its practices.”). 
 16. See infra notes 44–82 and accompanying text (referencing the O’Bannon 
and Jenkins litigations). 
 17. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 18. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why 
the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 61, 70 (2013). 
 19. Id. at 70–71. 
 20. Id. at 71. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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action; and (2) interstate commerce.23 A court will assess the presence of 
“concerted action” by considering “whether there is evidence of an 
agreement, either written or implied, between entities that lack a common 
objective.”24 Meanwhile, a court will determine whether an alleged 
restraint affects interstate commerce based on whether the restraint 
involves “the exchange of buying and selling of commodities especially 
on a large scale involving transportation from place to place.”25 Under the 
modern view, any amount of exchange greater than de minimis constitutes 
“interstate commerce,” making “almost every activity from which [an] 
actor anticipates economic gain” sufficient to meet this threshold 
requirement.26  
Thereafter, a court will determine whether a given restraint “unduly 
suppresses competition” by applying one of the approved tests along the 
antitrust “spectrum.”27 On one end of the spectrum, if a restraint is so 
nefarious that a high probability exists that the restraint lacks any 
redeeming value whatsoever, a court will apply the per se test, which 
simply presumes illegality without any further inquiry.28 Meanwhile, on 
the other end of the spectrum, if a court, upon first glance, believes the 
restraint may have some competitive benefit, the court instead will apply 
a full Rule of Reason inquiry.29 Under a full Rule of Reason inquiry, a 
court will need to “distinguish[] between restraints with anticompetitive 
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating 
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.”30 To accomplish this, 
a court will examine every aspect of an alleged restraint, including whether 
the parties involved had the power to control any relevant market, whether 
the restraint encourages or discourages competition, and whether the 
restraint causes any “antitrust harm,” or, stated otherwise, harm to 
consumers.31 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 72. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 26. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 206 
(2d ed. 2000); see also Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust 
Law, supra note 18, at 72–73 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 27. Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 
18, at 73. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). 
 31. Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 
18, at 73–74. 
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2. Applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s No Pay 
Rules 
Based upon the foregoing, there are at least two theoretical means by 
which a plaintiff could challenge the NCAA’s no pay rules implicit within 
its Principle of Amateurism under Section 1 of the Sherman Act..32 The 
first way is to argue that aspects of the NCAA Principle of Amateurism 
“represent a form of wage fixing that harms not only the market for college 
athlete services but also the quality of college sports’ on-field product.”33 
The second way is to argue that the NCAA rules against colleges paying 
their athletes constitute a form of illegal group boycott against colleges 
that would otherwise wish to pay their athletes.34 
Under both legal theories, it is overwhelmingly likely that the antitrust 
claims against the NCAA’s no-pay rules would meet both of the Sherman 
Act’s Section 1 threshold requirements. With respect to the first threshold 
issue of “concerted action,” the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in American 
Needle v. National Football League explains that a court may infer concerted 
action based on “how the parties involved in [the] alleged anticompetitive 
conduct actually operate.”35 Much like professional football teams, colleges 
with collegiate sports teams operate as competitors, given that each college 
operates a separate business that competes against one another for student-
athletes, tuition dollars, and athletic revenues.36  
Meanwhile, with respect to the second threshold issue of “interstate 
commerce,” both legal and economic realities seem to recognize that 
NCAA members engage in the “exchange of buying and selling of 
commodities” across state lines—even though a limited number of federal 
court decisions have held otherwise.37 Indeed, it is difficult to dispute the 
“commercial” nature of today’s NCAA Division I football and men’s 
basketball, given that “[49] college athletics departments earn annual 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. at 75. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010). Because 
the NCAA is composed of individual member colleges that control the decision-
making of the NCAA, all—or at least most—NCAA conduct would constitute 
“concerted” behavior under federal antitrust laws. Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s 
“Death Penalty” Sanction—Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group 
Boycott in Disguise, 18 LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 385, 403 (2014). 
 36. See generally Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 199 (describing the test for 
competitors within a joint venture).  
 37. Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 18, 
at 75. 
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revenues that exceed $70 million[,]” with most of such revenue derived 
from these two sports.38 In addition, NCAA members pay the association’s 
president an annual salary of $1.8 million and pay their athletic conference 
commissioners salaries as high as $3.5 million per year—further evidence 
of bona fide commercial activity.39  
Turning next to the competitive effects analysis, most courts today 
would review the NCAA’s amateurism rules under the full Rule of Reason 
test because the NCAA represents a classic “joint venture.” A “joint 
venture” is defined as “a collaboration among competitors designed to 
achieve a specific business objective through some integration of resources 
or risk.”40 Applying the full Rule of Reason test, a plaintiff would bear the 
initial burden of presenting evidence to show that the NCAA both maintains 
market power and implements its amateurism rules in a manner that 
suppresses competition and harms consumers.41 Given that it is relatively 
well-settled that NCAA member colleges maintain close to 100% of the 
market for collegiate athletic labor, the pivotal legal issue in an antitrust 
assessment likely would turn on whether the NCAA’s rules yield net 
anticompetitive effects and hamper consumer demand within the relevant 
market.42 
B. O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
O’Bannon v. NCAA was the first meaningful antitrust challenge that 
sought to overturn the NCAA’s “amateurism” rules as a form of illegal 
wage fixing and group boycott under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.43 The 
                                                                                                             
 38. Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons 
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College 
Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1630–31 (2017). 
 39. Id. at 1631. 
 40. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaboration 
among Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1171 (2001); see also Daniel A. Rascher 
& Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable Nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-
Time College Sports, 14 ANTITRUST 51 (2000) (“The NCAA is more appropriately 
described as a joint venture that has, like other joint ventures, certain aspects that must 
be agreed upon.”); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(explaining that both the plaintiffs’ economic expert and the NCAA’s economic 
expert opine that the NCAA operates as a “joint venture”). 
 41. Edelman, The NCAA’s “Death Penalty” Sanction, supra note 35, at 407. 
 42. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that 
courts will consider in a proper Rule of Reason antitrust analysis). 
 43. For a more thorough discussion of the procedural history in the O’Bannon 
litigation as well as an understanding of the precedent antitrust cases reasonably relied 
upon by plaintiffs’ lawyers in O’Bannon, see Marc Edelman, The District Court 
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case’s named plaintiff, Ed O’Bannon, was an All-American college 
basketball player at UCLA who, upon leaving college, played in the NBA 
and later became a car salesman.44 While visiting a friend’s home, Ed 
O’Bannon learned that his image had appeared in a college basketball video 
game produced by Electronic Arts.45 Electronic Arts had paid a licensing fee 
to the NCAA for the use of its intellectual property.46 Electronic Arts, 
however, had not paid Ed O’Bannon or any college player for the use of 
their likeness.47 
1. Case Overview 
Although the real substance of Ed O’Bannon’s legal dispute arose from 
the alleged infringement of his intellectual property rights, O’Bannon’s 
legal complaint alleged, among other things, that the NCAA member 
colleges had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring “to fix the 
price of former student athletes’ images at zero and to boycott former 
student athletes in the collegiate licensing market.”48 Thus, the purported 
antitrust violation was the NCAA’s mandate that all member colleges 
require their athletes to sign an identical release.49 
                                                                                                             
Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step 
Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2322–23 (2014). 
 44. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Dave 
Sheinen, Ed O’Bannon Has Gone from the Hardwood to the Sales Floor, WASH. POST 
(June 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06 
/11/AR2009061103332.html [https://perma.cc/SS8Q-BKJB]. 
 45. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049. 
 46. See NCAA Settles with Former Athletes, ESPN (June 9, 2014), http://www 
.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11055977/ncaa-reaches-20m-settlement-video- 
game-claims [https://perma.cc/DDV2-MKVR]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Order on CAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss at 9, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); 
see also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. (“[T]he gravamen of O’Bannon’s complaint 
was that the NCAA’s amateurism rules, insofar as they prevented student-athletes 
from being compensated for the use of their NILs, were an illegal restraint of trade 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
 49. See Dan Wolken & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Removes Name-Likeness 
Release from Student-Athletes’ Forms, USA TODAY (July 18, 2014), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/college/2014/07/18/ncaa-name-and-likeness-release-student- 
athlete-statement-form/12840997 (explaining that, until well into the O’Bannon 
litigation, the NCAA had required individuals who wanted to play college sports to 
sign away the rights to their names and likenesses in a standard form document) 
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2. Bench Trial and District Court Decision 
After many years of pleadings and oral arguments, litigation in O’Bannon 
proceeded to a bench trial in which Honorable Claudia Wilken of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled on the 
outstanding issues of both fact and law.50 Upon review, Judge Wilken ruled 
generally in Ed O’Bannon’s favor. Specifically, the court held that the NCAA 
member colleges acted concertedly with one another, engaged in interstate 
commerce, and unreasonably restrained trade in the market for certain 
educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA Division I schools.51  
The district court’s order enjoined the NCAA from enforcing any rules 
that “would prohibit its member schools and conferences from offering their 
FBS football and Division I [men’s] basketball recruits a limited share of the 
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses, in 
addition to a full grant-in-aid.”52 This order marked a first in sports-antitrust 
jurisprudence.53 
Nevertheless, the district court’s order did not establish an absolutely 
free market for college athletes’ services.54 Instead, the order forbade the 
NCAA only from restricting payments to athletes that exceeded the full cost 
of their college attendance—an amount greater than the NCAA’s then-limit 
on scholarships—plus deferred compensation of $5,000 per year.55 This 
limit on college athlete pay was based on the court’s conclusion that any 
greater payments would harm the overall consumer demand for fans to 
watch college sporting events, negating antitrust law’s goal of maximizing 
consumer welfare.56 
One of the main reasons why the plaintiffs in O’Bannon could not 
secure a broader injunction against the NCAA was because Judge Wilken 
gave some weight to the testimony of the NCAA’s research expert, Dr. J. 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/JFH4-3CR3]. See generally Marc Edelman, Closing the Free 
Speech Loophole: The Case for Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity Rights in 
Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 570–71 (2013) (discussing the scope 
of what rights, if any, college athletes had truly signed away based on the NCAA’s 
mandatory paperwork). 
 50. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 51. Id. at 963. 
 52. Id. at 1002; see also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1060 (explaining that the 
court’s injunction did not “require that all schools pay their student-athletes” but 
rather permitted them, if they chose, to do so). 
 53. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
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Michael Dennis. Dr. Dennis surveyed 2,455 respondents across the United 
States about their feelings toward paying elite college athletes different 
sums of money.57 Dr. Dennis’s survey began by asking respondents what 
they had heard previously about paying college athletes, leading many of 
the respondents to think about the “illegal or illicit payments” to athletes 
that the NCAA had long opposed.58 The survey proceeded to ask 
respondents “specifically whether they would be more or less likely to 
watch, listen to, or attend college football and basketball games if student-
athletes were paid” at various different theoretical levels of compensation.59 
According to Dr. Dennis’s findings, most survey respondents opposed 
athlete pay.60 
3. Appellate Court Decision 
Although the district court’s decision in O’Bannon brought only 
modest changes to the NCAA’s amateurism rules, the NCAA nevertheless 
appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.61 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s holding 
that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act but overturned the 
part of the district court’s injunction that would have allowed colleges to 
make deferred payments, in trust, to their athletes of up to $5,000 per year 
more than the cost of college attendance.62  
The appellate court relied even more heavily on Dr. Dennis’s 
consumer demand study than the district court had, as it opined that a 
remedy enjoining the NCAA from restricting even small payments to 
college athletes would be troublesome under antitrust law.63 In other 
words, according to the court, allowing any cash payment from colleges 
to their athletes would hurt “consumer demand.”64 The appellate court 
                                                                                                             
 57. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (“[69%] of respondents to Dr. Dennis’s survey expressed opposition 
to paying student-athletes while only [28%] favored pay them.”). 
 61. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049. 
 62. Id. at 1079; see also Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings at 3, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-2758-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016) 
(“[T]he majority [in O’Bannon] reversed the portion of the permanent injunction 
related to deferred compensation.”). But see generally O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 
1079–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (taking the opposing view, arguing that the 
district court’s injunction should have been upheld in full, allowing for small cash 
payments from colleges to their athletes without NCAA interference).  
 63. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. 
 64. Id. at 1077. 
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believed “consumer demand” would diminish because “[t]he difference 
between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and 
offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor 
[but rather] a quantum leap.”65 
The appellate court’s O’Bannon decision, which scaled back any 
financial gains secured by players at the district court level, since has been 
construed by the lawyers for both parties as a relative victory.66 The 
lawyers representing Ed O’Bannon claimed victory because the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling strongly fortified that aspects of the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules were collusive restraints that affected interstate commerce and were 
subject to economic review under antitrust law’s Rule of Reason.67 
Meanwhile, the NCAA’s lawyers focused on the practical reality that the 
only immediate change the NCAA would need to make to its amateurism 
rules was increasing the cap on athlete scholarships to reflect the true cost 
of college attendance.68 
C. Jenkins v. NCAA 
Although O’Bannon represents a small tangible gain for college 
athletes in terms of the available compensation, it was nevertheless an 
important legal victory for the college athletes’ rights movement because 
it opened the gateway for future college athletes to challenge the NCAA’s 
“no pay” rules more broadly under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.69 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 1078. 
 66. See Did the NCAA Win or Lose the O’Bannon Case Appeal, WBUR (Oct. 3, 
2015), http://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2015/10/03/ncaa-antitrust-obannon-lawsuit 
(expressing disagreement as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon was 
actually a win for the plaintiffs or the defendants) [https://perma.cc/33AK-W2JL]. 
 67. See Joe Nocera, Ed O’Bannon’s Hollow Victory Over the N.C.A.A., N. Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2015, at A-23 (“Michael Hausfeld, Ed O’Bannon’s lead lawyer, 
quickly declared victory — and having the N.C.A.A. deemed an antitrust violator 
surely is a victory.”). 
 68. See generally id. (“In a conference call, Mark Emmert, the [NCAA]’s 
president, pronounced himself ‘pleased’ [with the court’s ruling in O’Bannon].”); 
Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means for O’Bannon’s Ongoing 
NCAA Lawsuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2015/09/30/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appeals-court-ruling (“The NCAA 
and its members are pleased that they will not need to fund trusts for student-athletes’ 
NIL right.”) [https://perma.cc/347U-99C2]. 
 69. Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 43, at 2352–55 (discussing how the 
district court’s ruling that the NCAA amateurism rules were subject to substantive 
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Lurking behind O’Bannon on the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California’s docket is another sports antitrust case, Jenkins v. 
NCAA, which seeks to use the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon as a 
starting point to challenge the NCAA’s broader rules that prevent colleges 
from financially competing to sign new athletes.70  
At the time Jenkins was filed, the plaintiffs in that case had sought to 
overturn the NCAA grant-in-aid cap, which had been set at “the value of 
tuition, fees, room and board and required course books.”71 Even after the 
O’Bannon decision required the NCAA to raise its maximum permissible 
scholarship amount, the plaintiffs in Jenkins continued to challenge the 
new NCAA payment cap as yet another illegal restraint of trade.72 
1. Case Overview 
The litigation in Jenkins commenced on March 17, 2014 when five 
attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA and its “Power Five 
Conferences”—the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Twelve Conference, 
Big Ten Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and Southeastern Conference—in 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.73 Martin 
Jenkins, the lead plaintiff in the case, had been a starting defensive back for 
                                                                                                             
review under Section 1 of the Sherman Act opens the door for future lawsuits to 
usher far greater change to the economics of big-time college sports). 
 70. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2. The Jenkins lawsuit seeks both to enjoin 
the NCAA from enforcing its “no pay” rules of college athletes and to allow a 
class of plaintiffs, who were victims of these wage-fixing rules, to recover 
monetary damages. Id. at 2, 4; see also Berry, supra note 4, at 556 (“Jenkins . . . 
goes further in challenging the current system [because unlike O’Bannon] which 
focused solely on the use of student-athletes’ names and likenesses, Jenkins 
challenges the entire amateurism structure arguing that restricting the ability of 
individual institutions to compensate their athletes constitutes an unlawful 
restriction on commerce.”). 
 71. Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2, Jenkins v. 
NCAA, No. 14-2758-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 42. The lead attorney whose name appeared 
on the complaint, Jeffrey Kessler, previously had secured important antitrust victories 
for the National Football League Players Association in federal litigation against the 
NFL. See Jon Solomon, Meet Jeffrey Kessler: Lawyer Whose Suit Strikes Fear in 
NCAA’s Heart, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/meet-jeffrey-kessler-lawyer-whose-suit-strikes-fear-in-ncaas-heart 
[https://perma.cc/CP9L-Q6AH]. 
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Clemson University—a college whose athletics department generated more 
than $70 million in revenues in 2012.74  
The Jenkins complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that the NCAA’s 
“agreements to price-fix players compensation, and to boycott any institutions 
or players who refuse to comply with the price fixing agreement, are per se 
illegal acts under Section 1 of the Sherman Act” or, in the alternative, “an 
unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason.”75 Thus, the Jenkins 
complaint fundamentally differs from the O’Bannon complaint in that it 
draws no nexus between the use of a college athlete’s likenesses and right 
to earn financial compensation.76 Instead, it focuses exclusively on the 
NCAA’s purported wage restraints in the labor markets to sign college 
athletes.77 
During the preliminary stages of the Jenkins litigation, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the plaintiff’s motion 
to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California to consolidate aspects of Jenkins with O’Bannon and 
a third amateurism-antitrust litigation that since has settled, Alston v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association.78 From there, Jenkins was placed 
on the docket of Judge Claudia Wilken, who was already familiar with the 
legal and factual issues based upon her role in deciding O’Bannon.79 Since 
the case’s transfer, the NCAA twice has attempted to have the case 
summarily dismissed.80 Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California has rejected both of these motions.81 Unless 
the NCAA successfully moves for summary judgment at the close of 
                                                                                                             
 74. Complaint, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
 75. Id. at 3. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Transfer Order, In re: NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation, No. 3-14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. June 17, 2014). 
 79. See id.; see also supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text (discussing 
Judge Wilken’s role as the finder of both fact and law at the district court level in 
O’Bannon). 
 80. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Jenkins v. NCAA; Order Denying 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-2758-CW (N.D. 
Cal. Aug 5, 2016). 
 81. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-2758-
CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2014); Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-2758-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016). 
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discovery, which is soon forthcoming, a trial in Jenkins is anticipated for 
2018.82 
2. Why Jenkins May Prove a Game Changer for College Athletes’ 
Rights 
Although the Jenkins case has some similarities to O’Bannon, there 
are a number of reasons to believe it may yield broader financial gains for 
elite college athletes. First, the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
O’Bannon obviates the need for the lawyers in Jenkins to address whether 
their claims meet the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny or 
whether these claims are subject to a Rule of Reason inquiry.83 Instead, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers can focus their efforts exclusively on arguing about the 
negative economic impact of the NCAA’s no pay rules.84 By limiting the 
scope of what the plaintiffs’ lawyers must argue to those issues pertaining 
to economic impact, it is likely that the plaintiffs’ lawyers will devote more 
resources to an economic analysis of amateurism, including, perhaps, 
providing a surveying expert to produce a counter-study to the one 
generated by Dr. Dennis. 
Second, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Jenkins need not contend with 
complex issues regarding the value of individual athletes’ publicity rights 
in the context of an antitrust analysis. This issue is irrelevant in Jenkins 
because the plaintiffs argue that the NCAA engages in a wage-fixing 
restraint in the market for signing college athletes rather than the market 
for using their likenesses.85 Thus, whereas it is theoretically possible that 
a college athletes’ publicity rights may have no economic value when used 
on television, such a finding would not have a direct impact on the court’s 
order in Jenkins.  
Finally, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Jenkins have the benefit of learning 
from the pitfalls encountered by the lawyers when litigating O’Bannon. 
Perhaps the biggest stumbling block for the plaintiffs in O’Bannon was 
addressing the issue of “consumer demand” in light of Dr. Dennis’s expert 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Todd Cunningham, NCAA Hire of Wilkinson Sets up Dream Matchup in 
Antitrust Case, NAT’L LAW J. (June 14, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal 
.com/id=1202789831539/NCAA-Hire-of-Wilkinson-Sets-Up-Dream-Matchup-in- 
Antitrust-Case (stating that if the NCAA fails to secure summary judgment at the close 
of discovery, a trial in Jenkins would be likely for late 2018) [https://perma.cc/X4UG-
YHGS]. 
 83. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
 84. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 85. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
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study.86 There are a number of ways in which the plaintiffs in Jenkins can 
attempt to tackle this issue, even though continuing to adopt the approach 
taken by the lawyers in O’Bannon likely will lead to a replication of the mixed 
result generated in that case.87 
III. WHAT IT WOULD TAKE FOR COLLEGE ATHLETES 
TRULY TO PREVAIL IN JENKINS V. NCAA 
For the plaintiffs to prevail in Jenkins, their lawyers will need to adopt at 
least one of three alternative approaches to address the issues of consumer 
demand related to lifting the NCAA amateurism rules.88 
One potential approach is to convince the court that, despite its holding in 
O’Bannon, fan interest in watching college sports is irrelevant to a proper 
labor-side antitrust analysis of consumer demand. Although it is rather 
incontrovertible that antitrust law is about preserving consumer welfare, one 
reasonably could argue that, in a labor-side antitrust lawsuit such as Jenkins, 
the true consumers entitled to protection by antitrust law are the colleges 
seeking to purchase athletic labor and not the fans watching college sporting 
events live or on television.89 This argument, albeit not meaningfully 
considered in O’Bannon, has some support grounded in previous Supreme 
Court antitrust decisions.90 For example, in United States v. National Society 
of Professional Engineers, the Court held that antitrust law’s Rule of Reason 
serves exclusively to “form a judgment about the competitive significance of 
                                                                                                             
 86. See Marc Edelman, Single Legal Mistake Cost Plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. 
NCAA: Lack of Consumer Demand, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/09/30/single-legal-mistake-cost-plaintiffs-in- 
obannon-v-ncaa-lack-of-consumer-demand-study/#2d38a6ea4283 [https://perma.cc 
/CN24-VUHR]. 
 87. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076 (“We cannot agree that a rule permitting 
schools to pay students pure cash compensation and a rule forbidding them from 
paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in promoting amateurism and 
preserving consumer demand.”). 
 88. See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 89. Cf. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.D.C. 1995) (“So, 
even proceeding from the premise that antitrust laws aim only at protecting 
consumers, monopsonies fall under antitrust purview because monopsonistic 
practices will eventually adversely affect consumer.”); Gregory J. Werden, 
Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 
ANTITRUST L. J. 707, 737 (2007) (“Promoting consumer welfare is a goal of the 
Sherman Act, but only a goal, and that making end-user welfare the touchstone 
under the Act could have extraordinarily undesirable consequences.”). 
 90. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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[a given] restraint [and not] to decide whether a policy favoring competition 
is in the public interest.”91  
Alternatively, the Jenkins plaintiffs may attempt to tackle the consumer 
demand issue by producing a proper counter-study to show that paying 
college athletes actually would not decrease consumer demand to watch 
collegiate sporting events. The ideal consumer demand study would analyze 
actual consumer decisions to buy college sports tickets in situations in which 
it was believed widely that particular colleges were paying their athletes in 
violation of NCAA rules. Without even conducting such a study, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that when colleges have paid their athletes in violation 
of the NCAA rules, the NCAA’s investigations into such payments have not 
reduced consumer demand to watch collegiate sports.92 
Finally, the Jenkins plaintiffs also may seek to use behavioral psychology 
to better rebut the findings of Dr. Dennis’s study that purports to link paying 
college athletes with lower consumer demand to watch college sports.93 Upon 
a more careful analysis of Dr. Dennis’s study through the lens of behavioral 
psychology, there are a number of inappropriate ways in which the survey 
administrators seemed to “prime” or “pre-suade” respondents into opposing 
college athlete pay.94 For example, the first question that the surveyors asked 
respondents in Dr. Dennis’s study is what they had heard about paying college 
athletes, which, in turn, led many respondents to think about the negative 
connotations the NCAA has long associated with college athlete pay.95 This 
line of questioning “stacks the deck by focusing people, unduly, on their 
dissatisfaction.”96 
                                                                                                             
 91. United States v. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 92. For examples of scandals that NCAA member schools were paying their 
star football players, none of which negatively impacted college football 
attendance at these schools, see Top 5 Pay to Play Scandals Rocking College 
Football, THE WEEK (Jan. 6, 2011), http://theweek.com/articles/488252/5-pay-
play-scandals-rocking-college-football [https://perma.cc/GS37-2JWN]. 
 93. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 94. ROBERT CIALDINI, PRE-SUASION: A REVOLUTIONARY WAY TO INFLUENCE 
AND PERSUADE 4 (2016) (“[Pre-suasion is] the process of arranging for recipients to 
be receptive to a message before they encounter it.”). 
 95. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 96. CIALDINI, supra note 94, at 23–24. See also O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 
975 (recognizing this issue by explaining that the survey respondents had been 
“primed” in a particular manner). Robert Cialdini, a renowned Professor Emeritus 
of Psychology and Marketing at Arizona State University, described this behavior 
of focusing on unhappiness to lead people to describe themselves as unhappy as 
“target chuting,” and pointed out that this is a strategy frequently used by cults to 
convince individuals that they are sufficiently unhappy to consider membership. 
CIALDINI, supra note 94, at 23. 
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Other problems with Dr. Dennis’s study include the survey’s singular 
focus on athlete pay rather than including other factors that also may impact 
fan interest—a surveying technique that may forge a false causal relationship 
in respondents’ minds between athlete pay and their level of fan interest.97 
Finally, the NCAA consumer demand study may confuse its respondents by 
failing to state affirmatively that paying college athletes would not increase 
their cost of game tickets.98 Given that many colleges are already price 
maximizers when selling game tickets, it is likely that moving to a pay-for-
play model would not increase ticket prices by one cent. 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in O’Bannon can be analogized 
to the work of an offensive lineman in a college football game. On the surface, 
O’Bannon produced only a mundane victory for the players, as it did not 
“score a touchdown” on the issue of paying college athletes. On a deeper legal 
level, however, the court’s recognition that the NCAA amateurism rules are 
subject to antitrust analysis under the Rule of Reason standard creates a big 
hole through which a future antitrust litigant, with a proper consumer demand 
study, could run for that touchdown. 
In the movement to create a free market for college athletes’ services, 
much of the difficult legal work already has been accomplished. The one 
major challenge remaining for the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Jenkins is to either 
legally or factually rebut the presumption that the NCAA’s “no pay” rules 
enhance consumer outcome in the antitrust context. Though there are several 
ways the Jenkins plaintiffs can accomplish this task, one feasible approach 
entails having an expert witness produce a factual study concluding that there 
is no bona fide link between the NCAA’s “no pay” rules and consumer 
demand for college sports. If the plaintiffs in Jenkins were to produce a study 
that strikes down the purported link between the NCAA’s “no pay” rules and 
consumer demand in the antitrust sense, then the plaintiffs would be likely to 
prevail on the merits and legally achieve eradication of the NCAA’s 
nationwide “no pay” rules that continue to keep much of the revenues derived 
from college sports in the hands of a select few administrators, athletics 
directors, and coaches. 
                                                                                                             
 97. See CIALDINI, supra note 94, at 54 (explaining how what is focal to 
someone often becomes seen as causal, even when that often is not the case); see 
also id. at 51–53 (describing how people often overestimate the impact of money 
on changing individuals’ behavior because the exchange of money is so focal). 
 98. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975 (discussing NCAA consumer demand 
study). 
